Burmese Heroin: Hidden Deals

From The New Internationalist Magazine #280, 1996

This is a good article, but it doesn’t address the way that the American War on Drugs creates chaos and death worldwide.

Heroin’s hidden deals
Burma produces more than half the world’s raw heroin.
But who controls the lucrative drug trade now?
Faith Doherty reports.

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The announcement made at the beginning of January 1996 that Burma’s opium warlord Khun Sa had surrendered to the country’s ruling junta caught virtually all parties by surprise. Since his surrender it has become clear – as suggested by many Burma-watchers over the years – that Khun Sa’s departure will not greatly alter the situation. The fact that Burma supplies more than half of the world’s heroin has never depended on one man or one organization.

In the United States 60 per cent of heroin sold on the streets originates from the Golden Triangle and the region has been a major focus of anti-narcotic agencies and governments for decades – with little apparent effect. The previous General Ne Win-led governments and the present SLORC junta have all approached the drug problem in Burma by playing a two-faced game: on one side requesting support from the West to eradicate drugs and do battle with Khun Sa, and on the other, doing lucrative deals with drug kingpins. And opium is Burma’s most lucrative cash crop.

Now that the junta has secured military ceasefires with all ethnic rebel groups dependent on the opium economy for their survival, the surrender of Khun Sa should ensure that the spotlight again goes back on to Rangoon. But will it? Since Khun Sa’s surrender, the junta has stated that it will militarily control the territory previously held by Khun Sa and his Mong Tai Army. The junta has further promised that there will be a 70-per-cent reduction in the flow of heroin from Burma now that the prime growing areas have ‘joined the legal fold’. Time will tell. But given that the military have repeatedly reiterated their hatred for the ‘notorious drug-lord Khun Sa’, and that their past statements have ruled out both dialogue and any agreement with him or with the Mong Tai Army, such statements must be taken with more than a pinch of salt.

Khun Sa’s Shan people are not alone in their struggle with warlords, the junta and dependence on the opium economy. Other ethnic nationalities, such as the Wa and Kokang, have long been involved in the cultivation of opium to fund their fight for independence from Rangoon. In the late 1980s both the Wa and Kokang concluded ceasefire agreements with Rangoon. Yet their cultivation and sale of opium continues essentially unchanged. The junta used military force to drive both ethnic groups to sign these ceasefire agreements – no significant political settlements have been made.

For years the US used Khun Sa as their big bogey of the Golden Triangle: Khun Sa was Public Enemy Number One. Other drug-lords in the area, meanwhile, have become more influential but have kept much lower profiles. Despite considerable evidence that other groups and individuals were involved in the multi-billion dollar industry, there were many who believed Khun Sa’s capture would severely damage the flow of heroin. The logical next step for anti-narcotics officials was to work closely with the junta as the only way to have an impact on the export of heroin. This position failed to understand that the Shan people themselves saw their struggle not as a drug war but as a national struggle for self-determination. There is now an uncomfortable silence from those who pushed to empower the junta. Anti-narcotic officials are now forced to admit that Khun Sa’s surrender is likely to have little or no impact on the flow of heroin.

In 1989 and 1992 indictments were handed down in New York courts against Khun Sa. But after his surrender, the junta announced that it would not hand him over to US authorities for extradition and trial. The US responded by offering two million dollars for any information leading to his arrest. According to sources in Rangoon, the last thing the authorities would do is hand over the drug-baron. The reason is simple: he knows far too much and would be in a position to expose too many influential people, including junta members, involved in the trade.

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Recent reports published through wire agencies in Bangkok revealed that Khun Sa has been paying a Burmese regional commander a monthly fee of around $5,000 a month (the average monthly wage for a Burmese citizen is under $25 a month). A ‘large sum’ of money was also paid to a Burmese army general, apparently in order to secure his surrender and peaceful retirement. Reports of this kind have not surfaced so openly in the past few years, but it is widely known that there are members of the authorities in Rangoon on the payroll of drug traders, including prominent past kingpins, such as Lo Hseing Han.

At the time of writing, it’s harvest time for opium in Burma. Khun Sa is not there to send his men to pick, nor are the mule trains lined up to carry the crop through his territory to his refineries. What will happen to the thousands of tonnes of opium currently being picked by ethnic people, people who now depend entirely on the business that Khun Sa and others have created? With other drug dealers only too ready to step in, it is unlikely this vast harvest will go to waste. As for the junta, this is the time for them to show their sincerity about drug control.

Corrupt generals are an old story in Burma, but SLORC control of the Shan opium-growing regions is new. It is now up to the junta to turn off the heroin spigot, if this is their true intention. The world is waiting. If heroin continues to flow unabated onto the streets of New York, Los Angeles and Rangoon, there will be only one culprit now. We can only hope that Khun Sa’s departure wakes up all those concerned with the Golden Triangle heroin problem to its only real solution: an end to the political crisis in Burma.

Faith Doherty is a Burma-watcher working with the Southeast Asian Information Network (SAIN) in Bangkok.

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Burma’s Ethnic Conflict and Imperialism: A WikiSummary and a Personal Note

My husband and I meet with Karen refugees in Thailand, and know many who have moved to Europe and America. In Burma they are often kept very poor and not allowed good jobs in the city, they live in villages which are constantly harassed by both the Burmese and Karenni “armies” (really, gangs) for food and women.

“Civil wars have been a constant feature of Burma’s socio-political landscape since independence in 1948. This was largely the result of divide and conquer tactics employed by imperialists (British and Japanese) stationed in Burma during the pre-independence period.
The most widely publicized conflict in Burma during 2012 has been the 2012 Rakhine State riots, a series of ongoing conflicts primarily between ethnic Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims in northern Rakhine State. The Burmese government has claimed that the Rohingya are illegal migrants however the ethnic group has lived in Burma for hundreds of years and despite practicing a different religion (Islam) than the majority Buddhist population, the roots of conflict likely have more to do with colonial era policies that privileged one ethnic group over another in an attempt to divide and rule the population. Additional non-religious causes include violence stemming from the Japanese occupation of Burma in World War II during which the British allied themselves with Rohingya groups who fought against the puppet government of Burma which had been set up by the Japanese and helped to establish the Tatmadaw or Burmese armed forces, fascist elements of which continue to rule to country to this day.

During 1943 and 1944, the BNA made contacts with other political groups inside Burma such as the communists who had taken to the hills in 1942. Eventually, a popular front organisation called the Anti-Fascist Organisation (AFO) was formed with Thakin Soe, a founder of the communist party in Burma, as leader. Through the communists and a Japanese-sponsored force known as the Arakan Defence Army, the Burmese were eventually able to make contact with the British Force 136 in India. The initial contacts were always indirect. Force 136 was also able to make contacts with members of the BNA’s Karen unit in Rangoon through agents dropped by parachute into the Karenni, the Karen-populated area in the east of Burma.
At the time of Myanmar’s independence in 1948, the Tatmadaw was weak, small and disunited. Cracks appeared along the lines of racial background, political affiliation, organisational origin and different services. Its unity and operational efficiency was further weakened by the interference of civilians and politicians in military affairs, and the perception gap between the staff officers and field commanders. The most serious problem was the tension between Karen Officers, coming from the British Burma Army and Bamar officers, coming from the Patriotic Burmese Force.

To this day the Karen/Karenni people and the Rohingya remain some of the most persecuted minorities on Earth; thanks to Anglo-American Imperialist policies of divide-and-conquer.

The Karenni are majority Buddhist. Some Christian, and a few Muslims, also exist. Others are practicing native traditions unrelated to Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity or Islam. The Karenni ethnic conflict is a major reason for the persecution of religion in Myanmar.

Burma’s Longest War: An Anatomy of the Karenni Conflict

Free Burma Rangers